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Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
Much ink and wind was expended during the tragic last few 
weeks of Terri Schiavo's life, debating the facts and issues sur-
rounding her death. But it reduces to this: The State of Florida, 
acting through its judiciary, ordered a severely disabled woman 
to be slowly dehydrated and starved to death, by removing her 
feeding tube. 
This sort of thing, of course, happens all the time.1 The ex-
ceptional feature of the Terri Schiavo case is not the situation it 
presented or the result produced, but the extraordinary attention 
it received, out of all proportion to anything genuinely unique 
about its facts. Many commentators have pointed this out, curi-
ously implying that this fact somehow justified the state's actions 
or rendered illegitimate the extraordinary efforts to save her life. 
It does not. To be sure, there is something odd in the treatment 
of Terri Schiavo's case as if it were one-of-a-kind. There is a cer-
tain Saving Private Ryan element to Killing Terri Schiavo: When 
so many others are being killed, why should anyone care about, 
let alone take heroic efforts to save, this one person? But just as 
the Steven Spielberg's famous movie frames a compelling story, 
the real-world story of Terri Schiavo is paradigmatic as well as 
dramatic. Whether the legal system produced a defensible result 
in this case tells us a lot about how the legal system should act in 
the many, many other cases that are not so very different. 
* McKnight Presidential Professor of Law & Public Policy, Briggs & Morgan Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am greatly indebted to Gary Law-
son for insights resulting from our discussion of the legal issues surrounding the Schiavo 
case near the time events were unfolding and to David Stras and Allan Erbsen for help-
ful comments on an earlier draft. I am responsible for the views expressed and for all er-
rors. 
1. For an excellent discussion of the unexceptional nature of the Schiavo fact pat-
tern and legal result, see Professor Edward Larson's contribution to this issue. Edward J. 
Larson, From Cruzan to Schiavo: Similar BedfeUows in Fact and at Law, 23 CONST. 
COMM. 405 (2006). One feature of Schiavo, however, is extraordinary. The Florida 
court's order is, in form, not merely an authorization to another to take the victim's life, 
but a directive from the court specifically to do so. 
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Unique, unusual attention on this case affords an opportunity for 
focused examination of issues of general importance. 
I 
The conventional legal fiction usually asserted to justify the 
killing of Terri Schiavo-a legal fiction that, while of recent vin-
tage, rapidly has become familiar and deeply embedded in the 
law-was that this is what she would have wanted, and therefore 
the state was justified in ordering it. By all accounts, Terri 
Schiavo had extremely little or no cognitive capacity. She was 
not in a coma, but she likely was in a "persistent vegetative 
state." Terri Schiavo had left no living will or advance medical 
directive as to what her desires were with respect to her medical 
care (and food and water) under such circumstances. Florida law 
provided that her husband could apply to a court for an order 
that she be starved and dehydrated to death if he could satisfy a 
court by "clear and convincing evidence" that this is what she 
wanted. A state trial judge so found, and the appellate courts de-
ferred to the trial judge's determination. 
There is no doubt that Terri Schiavo could have continued 
to live indefinitely in her deeply disabled condition. Her condi-
tion was tragic but not terminal. Removal of food and water, 
even if characterized as a decision regarding her "medical care," 
affirmatively killed her. At best, then, the killing of Terri 
Schiavo was a state-assisted suicide. At worst, it was a state-
ordered execution of a disabled person who had committed no 
crime and was unable to speak in her own defense. Which of the 
two it was-bad, or much worse-depends on the reliability of 
the determination of Terri Schiavo's "consent" to the slow tak-
ing of her life by order of a state judicial officer. 
My modest contention here is that the Constitution's re-
quirement that no person be deprived of his or her life without 
due process of law requires, at minimum, that the state not kill 
an individual who is not competent to express his or her wish for 
death and has given no advance directive, except on an eviden-
tiary showing that this was the victim's desire satisfying a stan-
dard of proof at least as high as that required to execute a mur-
derer-proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the proposition(s) 
thought to justify the state's life-depriving act. Moreover, as with 
the imposition of the death penalty, the greatest of procedural 
care and caution must be taken in guarding against a wrongful 
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decision, because of the terrible human finality of the state's ac-
tion. 
I submit that, except on the basis of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that the victim possessed and expressed a desire to be 
killed under the circumstances, state action to deprive the victim 
of her life fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is the one long 
held to be required by the Constitution for ordinary criminal 
convictions.2 It is difficult to see why any lesser standard should 
guard innocent disabled persons against wrongful or arbitrary 
execution on the mistaken, capricious, or malicious assertion of 
third persons that this is what the victim would want if she could 
speak for herself. (I have very serious doubts about the moral 
propriety of the state's granting of, and ordering the carrying out 
of, an individual's wish that she be killed, even where the victim's 
desire is expressed with unmistakable clarity, but that is a sepa-
rate question that I leave to one side for present purposes.) 
Another way of thinking about the same issue is that the 
state denies a disabled or incompetent person the equal protec-
tion of the laws when it grants to any third person a license to 
kill the disabled or incompetent person, or assumes such a power 
itself, on any lower showing of the victim's desire to be killed 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The very core of the 
Equal Protection Clause is that the state may not withdraw from 
its protection against the private violence of others (and certainly 
that should equally include the public violence of state actors) 
certain classes of individuals-most certainly including persons 
who are disabled and whose disability prevents them from pro-
tecting themselves, or speaking for themselves. Assuming (for 
the sake of argument) that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
absolutely forbid the state from ordering the killing of a person, 
not found guilty of any crime, on the application of another per-
son asserting the victim's consent, surely the standard for grant-
ing such a request on the basis of the legal fiction of the victim's 
consent, should be an extraordinarily high standard of proof that 
might warrant the finding of such constructive consent-proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or perhaps something higher yet.3 
2 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1979); see also Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 243 
n.6 (1999), Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). 
3. I am not advocating a "substantive due process" "right to live." The Due Proc-
ess Clause, properly construed, confers no substantive legal rights, but only a right to 
procedural regularity and propriety. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitu-
tional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 995, 1007-16 (2003). It is ironic, 
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This was not the standard employed in the state judicial de-
cision ordering the killing of Terri Schiavo. Rather, the Florida 
courts employed a lower, "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard-and employed it quite badly.4 Much of the subsequent 
federal Due Process Clause legal challenge to the validity of the 
state's action in ordering Terri Schiavo's food and water re-
moved focused on whether the trial judge could properly have 
found that the evidence presented satisfied the "clear-and-
convincing" standard, or whether the trial judge was an improp-
erly biased or otherwise poor decision-maker. Such contentions 
were scarcely frivolous, under the circumstances (and, as I argue 
below, the federal courts were surely wrong to deny interim in-
junctive relief to save Terri Schiavo, in order to consider those 
claims fully and carefully). But the fact that too low a legal stan-
dard of proof was employed in the first place is an even clearer 
(and more convincing) basis for concluding that the Florida 
courts' order deprived Terri Schiavo of her life without due 
process of law, and seemingly did so because of its legal treat-
ment of her disability, denying her the equal protection of the 
laws because of that status or condition. 
Where did this "clear and convincing" standard, seemingly 
so widely accepted, come from? The clear-and-convincing stan-
dard the Florida courts employed as a matter of state law, and 
that Schiavo's attorneys and the federal courts considering the 
though, that believers in the idea of "substantive due process" tend to champion a right 
to die (as against state-compelled life), but no presumptive right to live (as against state-
imposed death). See Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears Its Throat, 22 CoNST. CoMM. 
553, 553 n.1 (2006). My position is that procedural due process requires that a high stan-
dard of proof be satisfied before the state may order the killing of an innocent, disabled 
person on the theory that this is what (the state concludes) she would have wanted. My 
equal protection theory is substantive: The state may not deprive certain persons or 
classes of persons of the right to protection from the violence of others. 
The U.S. Supreme Court precedent most nearly on point and supportive of the 
Schiavo result (and, of course, rejecting the due process and equal protection arguments 
I advance here) is Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 2CY7 (1927) (rejecting procedural due proc-
ess and equal-protection-from-harm-i-:llicted-by-others claims, brought on behalf of a 
mentally disabled woman challenging non-consensual compulsory state sterilization of 
such persons, on the basis of Justice Holmes' eugenics-sympathetic quip that "three gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough."). More recent case law has been somewhat more sym-
pathetic to due process and equal protection claims brought by persons with disabilities. 
See, e.g., Oebume v. Oebume living Center, 473 U.S. 432,448,456 (1985), Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509,522-23 (2004). 
4. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 15-17 (Fla. 1990); In re 
Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 179-180 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001); In re 
Guardianship of Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6--7 (Fla. Or. a. 2000). Professor 
Carter Snead makes a powerful, seemingly overwhelming, case against the propriety of 
the Florida courts' application of this stated standard. 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising) 
Truth about Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of Autonomy, 22 CONST. CoMM. 383 (2006). 
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issue appear to have assumed was sufficient to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appears to have 
been borrowed from the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in the 
1990 case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.5 
The Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan, however, did not de-
cide that "clear and convincing" was a sufficient standard of 
proof to satisfy the Due Process Clause, in terms of the proce-
dural protections necessary to assure that a disabled person is 
not deprived of his or her life without notice and a fair opportu-
nity to be heard on the question of "consent" to the killing. 
Rather, the Court in Cruzan held that a "clear and convincing" 
standard did not violate any asserted substantive due process 
constitutional right that the disabled person might be thought to 
have with respect to the "right to die" by refusing food and wa-
ter. The Court in Cruzan held, sensibly, that even if one assumed 
the existence of a substantive due process liberty interest right to 
refuse medical treatment (as the Court was prepared to as-
sume),6 and even if one further assumed (for the sake of argu-
ment), that that interest extended to the right to die by self-
deprivation of food and water,7 Missouri's state law requirement 
that the victim's (silent) assertion of such a right be proved by 
"clear and convincing" evidence did not violate the (substantive) 
Due Process Clause, because of the state's interest in assuring 
that this was indeed the victim's position, and not erroneously, 
arbitrarily, or capriciously advanced by others.8 The Court no-
5. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
6. Id. at 278 ("[The] principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our 
prior decisions."). 
7. Id. at 279 ("[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the [Constitution] would 
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration 
and nutrition."). 
8. Id. at 281. The Court framed the question as "simply and starkly whether the 
Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of decision which it did." Id. at 
277. Here is the crux of the Court's analysis: 
We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed 
and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death. But in the 
context presented here, a State has more particular interests at stake. The 
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and 
overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard 
the personal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evi-
dentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Oause pro-
tects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical 
treatment. Not all incompetent patients will have loved ones available to serve 
as surrogate decisionmakers. And even where family members are present, 
'[t)here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in which family members 
will not act to protect a patient.' A State is entitled to guard against potential 
abuses in such situations. * * * [W)e conclude that a State may apply a clear and 
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discon-
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where said that such an evidentiary standard was sufficient, as 
against a claim made on behalf of the would-be victim not to 
have food or water removed, as a matter of procedural due 
process. And that was the issue presented by the facts of the 
Schiavo case. 
If I am correct that the Due Process Clause requires more 
than "clear and convincing" evidence of constructive consent 
where the victim is asserting (through a representative) a 
claimed constitutional right not to be killed by virtue of state ac-
tion (a state court order), then the killing of Terri Schiavo-and 
many others like her in similar such circumstances-was an 
egregious and horrible violation of the United States Constitu-
tion, committed by a state government. In short, if my hypothe-
sis about the meaning and application of the Due Process Clause 
in this context is correct, Florida killed a disabled person, who 
had committed no crime, on the basis of an unproved-under 
the proper constitutional standard-assertion that she wished to 
be killed. 
II 
Viewed in this light, the decision of Congress to provide for 
federal judicial review of potential federal constitutional objec-
tions to the state-ordered killing of Terri Schiavo pursuant to 
Florida statute and judicial order was eminently appropriate. 
There is substantial merit to the federal constitutional claim that 
a state deprives incompetent, disabled persons of life, without 
due process of law, when it orders such persons starved to death, 
on the application of another person, absent the strictest eviden-
tiary proof that this was the victim's considered and expressed 
desire when competent.9 Thus, it would have been appropriate 
(and still would be) for Congress to pass a general statute pro-
viding for federal jurisdiction to review such state court determi-
nations in any case where the issue is presented. 
The press of time, and politics, prevented Congress from 
enacting such a generally applicable law and so it passed "Terri's 
Law," governing her situation alone. There is nothing all that 
tinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegeta-
tive state. 
Id. at 280-81,284 (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394,419 (N.J. 1987)). 
9. For a persuasive argument that there was substantial merit to Terri Schiavo's 
constitutional claims as they were actually framed, see Snead, supra note 4. For further 
support for this position, see Clarke D. Forsythe, Protecting Unconscious, Medically-
Dependent Persons After Wendland and Schiavo, 22 CONST. COMM. 475 (2006). 
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unusual, and nothing at all unlawful, about such "private bill" 
legislation. That happens all the time. Terri's Law was a rare in-
stance of a grant of federal jurisdiction (as opposed to particular 
substantive relief) for one individual case, but it is difficult to see 
why that should make any difference to the constitutional pro-
priety of such an enactment (unless the substance of the jurisdic-
tional enactment is unconstitutional for some reason suggested 
by its particular provisions, a set of issues I take up presently). 
To be sure, there is something, well, singular about singling out 
this individual case from among many. But this is simply the 
Saving Private Ryan aspect of the whole episode, not a true le-
gal objection. Saving Terri Schiavo is a case of devoting extraor-
dinary resources and attention to a single individual. There is 
something exceptional about that. But there is nothing unconsti-
tutional about that.10 
Nor is there anything unconstitutional about the grant of 
federal jurisdiction on any other ground. The congressional stat-
ute scrupulously skirted the relevant doctrinal land mines, as if 
answering quite competently a short exam question covering a 
good chunk of ground in a standard Federal Jurisdiction law 
school course.11 
There is no "Klein problem" with the statute: Terri's Law 
does not legislatively direct the judicial outcome to be reached in 
the case. The statute merely creates jurisdiction for federal dis-
trict courts to review these issues and removes certain potential 
procedural hurdles to a court's determination of the merits. It 
does not tell the court how to come out.12 
10. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (noting that 
legislatures need not act through laws of general applicability and noting widespread 
practice of private bills); Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 380 (1940) 
("Private acts, as such, are not forbidden by the Constitution."). See generally Hartnett, 
supra note 3, at 566-68 (2006) (making the same point with regard to the act granting 
federal jurisdiction in the Schiavo matter). 
11. Professor Hartnett's contribution to this symposium persuasively shows that 
Judge Birch's lone, late-hit opinion concurring in the denial of en bane rehearing (see 
Schiavo v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005)), completely fails this short fed-
eral jurisdiction exam. Hartnett, supra note 3, passim. 
12. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 123 (1871). Klein holds (as near anyone can 
make sense of it) that Congress may not direct the courts to decide a specific case or class 
of cases a particular way. That is all Klein sensibly can be understood to mean, and 
Terri's Law does not come within the neighborhood of violating such a principle. In 
Klein itself, the Court struck down an act of Congress directing that the courts treat re-
ceipt of a presidential pardon by former civil war rebels as defeating certain legal claims 
by such persons, and requiring dismissal of such claims-exactly the opposite outcome 
the Court previously had held to be the legal effect of a presidential pardon. The case 
delights federal courts mavens/nerds-about six of whom purport to understand it-and 
justifiably perplexes everybody else. Klein is probably best understood as holding only 
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Nor is there any Klein problem (or any other kind of prob-
lem) with Congress abrogating prudential standing barriers to 
entertaining a particular case or class of cases, or with its abroga-
tion of any other purely prudential, non-statutory, judge-made 
doctrine for refraining to exercise otherwise proper statutory ju-
risdiction, such as "abstention." If the Constitution does not re-
quire a particular limitation on federal court jurisdiction, and 
Congress provides for jurisdiction by statute and sweeps away 
any non-constitutional judicial doctrine that might otherwise 
limit it, the court must exercise the jurisdiction conferred.13 
The infamously obscure Rooker-Feldman doctrine is no 
problem here, for exactly the same reason. Rooker and Feldman 
are cases of statutory interpretation, adopting a principle of lean-
ing against a reading of a statutory grant of jurisdiction that 
would permit, in effect, federal district court "appellate" review 
of state court judgments.14 But Terri's Law is clear in granting 
such statutory jurisdiction, leaving nothing to Rooker or 
Feldman-ize. Since the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not of consti-
tutional dimension, the grant of such district court jurisdiction is 
plainly constitutional.15 It is also totally familiar: habeas corpus 
jurisdiction grants such review all the time. 
that Congress may not, by statute, alter the legal effect of a previous presidential pardon 
and direct the courts to enforce such alteration. If it stands for anything more than that, it 
does not stand for much, since the Court has subsequently recognized that Congress may 
always alter the governing law and require courts to apply the new legal rule in pending 
cases. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
For a clash of titans over Klein's meaning and possible application to Schiavo, com-
pare Hartnett, supra note 3, at 569-79 (discussing and demythologizing "The Cult of 
Klein") with Evan Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CoNST. CoMM. 529 (2005) (discuss-
ing, and taking seriously, Klein's many possible meanings). Dean Caminker thinks there 
might be a Klein problem with statutory abrogation of judicial doctrines of discretionary 
abstention, prudential standing, and the like-because that directs how courts should 
"decide" those possible issues, by removing them. But this cannot possibly be the case. 
Even were such statutes somehow not viewed as changing the applicable law governing 
the case on these issues (rather than directing a result), to extend Klein in such a way 
would mean that Congress could not abrogate prudential standing (for example), contra-
dicting everything the Court has ever said about such judge-made prudential barriers to 
the exercise of statutory jurisdiction. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare De-
cisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 
YALE L.J. 1535, 1585-87 (2000). 
13. Professor Hartnett makes this point wonderfully clear. Hartnett, supra note 3, 
at 562-64. On the power of Congress to abrogate non-statutory, judge-made "prudential" 
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, see generally Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis 
by Statute, supra note 12 at 1585-87. 
14. Again, Hartnett is spot-on. Hartnett, supra note 3, at 558-59. 
15. See THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at 454-58 (Alexander Hamilton), (I. Kramnick 
ed. 1987) (explicitly contemplating federal lower court review of state court decisions on 
federal questions), Hartnett, supra note 3, at 558-60. 
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There is no "Plaut problem" with the grant of jurisdiction. 
Terri's Law did not direct the reopening of a final federal court 
judgment, which is what Plaut v. United States had held to be a 
violation of the Constitution's separation of powers.16 Terri's 
Law provided for federal review of a final state court judgment, 
but that is not unconstitutional under Plaut's reasoning. The pre-
clusive effect to be accorded a prior state court judgment in a 
subsequent federal court proceeding is a function of federal 
statutory law, not the Full Faith and Credit Clause (which con-
cerns states' obligations to abide the judgments of other states). 
The federal full faith and credit statute governs the preclusive 
effect of state court judgments in federal courts.17 But Congress 
can simply change the statute when it wants to, and that is what 
it did with Terri's Law. 
Again, this is very similar to what the federal habeas statute 
does for a great many cases. The fact that Terri's Law designated 
a de novo standard of review for the prior state court decision is 
no big deal. A gazillion federal statutes designate standards of 
review for federal court consideration or reconsideration of fac-
tual or legal determinations made by others. There is nothing 
unconstitutional about such provisions.18 
Finally, there is no Rayburn's Case problem with the grant 
of jurisdiction.19 Congress did not itself "decide" the merits of 
the Schiavo case on an appeal to the legislature from the final 
decision of the judiciary. It merely granted jurisdiction to federal 
courts and swept away non-constitutional barriers to the federal 
judiciary's resolution of the issue on its merits. It did not tell the 
courts what decision to reach, nor reverse a judicial decree with 
a legislative one. 
16. Plaut v. United States, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). There really was no "Plaut prob-
lem" in Plaut, either, but that personal quibble I will leave to develop on another occa-
sion, if at all. (Short version: The act at issue in Plaut sensibly could have been under-
stood as simply creating a new federal cause of action exactly congruent to the cause of 
action some parties lost by virtue of a new judicial interpretation of the applicable statu-
tory of limitations, waiving new filing fees, and providing for expedited consideration and 
use of an existing record in courts that had previously heard the earlier, but now unex-
pectedly time-barred, cases.) 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) ("The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States ... [and] [t]he records and judicial proceedings of any 
court of any such State, Territory or Possession . . . shall have the same full faith and 
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they 
are taken.") 
18. See Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 12, at 1582-90. 
19. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
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***** 
There is one more important procedural issue presented by 
the Schiavo case, and it is perhaps the issue that the federal 
courts got most badly wrong: the application of the legal stan-
dard for granting a preliminary injunction or temporary restrain-
ing order. Congress did not tell the federal courts what decision 
to reach in the Schiavo matter in any respect, even preliminarily. 
Congress did not attempt to direct the federal district court to 
grant a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction 
pending plenary consideration of the merits-even though it 
probably had power to do so as an incident of its power to pre-
scribe rules of procedure.20 
Congress's inaction on this procedural point left prior law in 
place with respect to the standard for granting preliminary in-
junctions. The formulation of that standard has differed some-
what from circuit to circuit, but always with some form of weigh-
ing the likelihood of success on the merits together with 
consideration of the degree and significance of the "irreparable 
injury" that would result if interim injunctive relief is wrongfully 
withheld or wrongfully granted during the pendency of the pro-
ceeding prior to full decision of the merits. Typically, the 
stronger the showing on one of these prongs, the less strong the 
showing required on the other. 
In the case of Terri Schiavo, the federal courts found little 
likelihood of success on the merits. As noted above, however, 
there are strong reasons to believe that Florida deprived Terri 
Schiavo of her life, without due process of law. At the very least, 
the claims should have been regarded as colorable and worthy of 
full, careful consideration. But the real atrocity in the denial of 
preliminary injunctive relief was the failure of the courts to grant 
interim relief so as to be able to take the careful look at the mer-
its that they should have taken. As irreparable injuries go, death 
is a pretty absolute and irrevocable one. The courts have, on this 
ground, taken extreme care to consider potential claims and de-
fenses by death row inmates. The terrible finality of execution by 
lethal action of the state requires that all reasonable considera-
tions in favor of restraint be taken. 
So too with Terri Schiavo. There surely was precious little 
harm in continuing to give food and water to Terri Schiavo. 
20. Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 12 at 1585 (discussing 
the Anti-Injunction Act); see Hartnett, supra note 3 at 579. If Congress can enact an 
Anti-Injunction Act, why could it not enact a Pro-Injunction Act? 
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There was no evidence that doing so was painful to her, or that 
continuing to live was painful or harmful to her. If indeed it were 
her wish to die (which was the precise point of uncertainty being 
litigated), that would not be permanently thwarted by delay and 
careful consideration of the opposite possibility, and by careful 
thought about the applicable standard for determining which po-
sition should prevail. If there was an injury at all by granting in-
terim relief, it was not an irreparable one but a temporary one. 
In contrast, if preliminary injunctive relief was wrongfully with-
held, the result was permanent: death. 
In light of this relative weighing of potential error costs, the 
failure of the federal courts to provide preliminary injunctive re-
lief of any kind, for any period of time, seems absolutely inex-
cusable. It was, with all respect, as plain a case of "abuse of dis-
cretion" -abuse of the concededly discretionary power of 
equity-as one can imagine. If there was any flaw in Terri's Law, 
it was certainly not that Congress went too far, telling courts how 
to rule in the specific case; it was that Congress did not go far 
enough, requiring interim relief upon a sufficiently low threshold 
standard and mandating that consideration of the merits take 
place without a rush to death. Terri Schiavo's case deserved at 
least the same time for reflective consideration as a multiple 
murderer on death row. Neither the courts, which bear primary 
responsibility, nor Congress, awarded her that degree of consid-
eration. 
III 
What of the third branch of government-the executive? 
What should a president, or a governor, do when it appears that 
the federal judiciary is about to order, or authorize, the killing of 
an innocent person, in apparent violation of the basic require-
ments of due process of law? 
My position here is one I have defended in the abstract else-
where: The executive branch is not bound by the faithless depar-
tures from the law promulgated by the courts, in any matter also 
requiring (or permitting) executive branch action or acquies-
cence.21 If ever there were a case for executive branch interven-
21. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to 
Say ~hat the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irre-
p~eSS!ble Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2706 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Nucon Now: The Courts and the Presidency after Twenty-five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1337 (1999); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of 
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tion to prevent the carrying out of a judicial order, in violation of 
the rights of a private person, this was the case. If the premise of 
this essay is correct-that Florida judicially ordered the killing of 
Terri Schiavo, in violation of the U.S. Constitution's procedural 
requirements before depriving an individual of her life- then the 
President, and the Governor of Florida, were constitutionally 
required, by virtue of their oaths to support the U.S. Constitu-
tion, to intervene to prevent the killing, if it was within their re-
spective executive powers to do so. 
It has become, sadly, our constitutional tradition for politi-
cal actors to defer, unblinkingly and almost unthinkingly, to the 
final decisions of courts, no matter the consequences. This is not 
a result required by the Constitution.22 But it is our practice. 
Schiavo shows just how far that practice has gone. Almost no le-
gal commentators (at least none of which I am aware) decried 
the failure of President George W. Bush or of Governor Jeb 
Bush to intervene, at the crucial last stages of Terri Schiavo's 
imminent demise, to rescue her from the killing work of the 
American judicial system, state and federal. We accept the judi-
ciary as the final authority over life and death. 
CODA 
Saving Private Ryan ends with Ryan, now an old man, visit-
ing a World War II cemetery, seeing the grave of the Captain 
who gave his life, and remembering the Captain's cryptic dying 
words exhorting Ryan to live a life worthy of the gift he had 
been given. Ryan was gripped with grief, and uncertainty, over 
whether he really had earned that gift. Killing Terri Schiavo 
ended less inspiringly, with Terri Schiavo's slow death by starva-
tion and dehydration. A nation that had been gripped in the me-
dia frenzy of the nationwide attention to her case, watched her 
die, commented, grieved, cheered. 
There is much to be learned from the case of the one, for 
the lives of many. Terri Schiavo's story does not have a happy 
ending, or even a bittersweet one. It is the story of slippery 
slopes, legal fictions, and the now commonplace legal inattention 
to the value of individual lives or the legal standards that should 
protect those lives. It is the story of a judicially ordered killing of 
an innocent, disabled woman. It is the story of a failure of all 
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81 (1993). 
22. See the arguments made in sources cited in note 21. 
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branches of government, legislative, executive and especially ju-
dicial, adequately to protect that particular life. It is an end-of-
life story that is likely to be repeated, without high legal drama, 
in the lives of many of us. It is, and will continue to be, the un-
told story of many legally sanctioned killings. Schiavo is a para-
digm case for our age. 
